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Abstract: This paper analyses how competition between media ﬁrms inﬂuences
the way they are ﬁnanced. In a setting where monopoly media ﬁrms choose to
be completely ﬁnanced by consumer payments, competition may lead the media
ﬁrms to be ﬁnanced by advertising as well. The closer substitutes the media ﬁrms’
products are, the less they rely on consumer payment and the more they rely on
advertising revenues. If media ﬁrms can invest in programming, they invest more
t h el e s sd i ﬀerentiated the media products are perceived to be.
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authors’ own and are not necessarily shared by the Norwegian Competition Authority.1 Introduction
Media ﬁrms can generate revenues in various ways. Some TV channels are for
example ﬁnanced by advertising revenue, while others rely on direct payment from
their viewers. Media ﬁrms may also combine diﬀerent ways to raise revenues, such as
when newspapers earn revenue both from advertising and from consumer payment.
Why do media ﬁrms choose diﬀerent ways to earn revenues? Why do we often
observe purely advertising-ﬁnanced media ﬁrms, even though empirical evidence
suggests that their audiences dislike commercials?1 Why not charge the audience
directly, and avoid product-damaging commercials? In answering these questions,
we present a simple model showing how competition between media ﬁrms can help
explain the way they are ﬁnanced.
To analyze the importance of the rivalry between media ﬁrms, we consider a
model of a media market where the audience dislikes advertising. The media ﬁrms
can for instance be TV channels, radio channels, or newspapers (printed or elec-
tronic). Each ﬁrm is ﬁnanced by advertising, direct payment from consumers, or
both. We ﬁnd that, in duopoly, the media ﬁrms are ﬁnanced partly by advertising
revenue and partly by consumer payments. The tougher the competition is, in the
sense of the media products being closer substitutes, the more do the media ﬁrms
rely on advertising revenues. Indeed, in the limit case where the media ﬁrms are
perfect substitutes, the whole proﬁto ft h em e d i aﬁrms comes from advertising.
In order to understand this result, note that competition in consumer prices is
qualitatively diﬀerent from competition in advertising prices. As is the case in more
1It is documented that viewers try to escape from advertising breaks on TV, see, e.g.,M o r i a r t y
and Everett (1994) and Danaher (1995). See also Wilbur (2004), who estimates a model of TV
competition and ﬁnds viewers’ disutility to be signiﬁcant and positive. For printed newspapers,
there are less clear answers as to whether consumers consider advertising as a good or as a bad,
and there are some indications that the extent to which people consider commercials as bad varies
across countries. For instance, it has been argued that newspaper readers in Europe have a more
negative attitude to advertising than those in the USA (Gabszewicz, et al., 2004a). Depken and
Wilson’s (2004) study of US magazines indicates that readers’ attitude to advertising is negative
in some magazines and positive in others.
1traditional markets, consumer prices are strategic complements: if one media ﬁrm
reduces the price it charges from its audience, it will be optimal for the other ﬁrm
to do the same. Advertising prices, on the other hand, are strategic substitutes; a
price reduction from one ﬁrm leads to a price increase from the other.2 To see why,
suppose that ﬁrm 1 reduces its advertising price. This leads to an increase in its
level of advertising, which is bad for its audience. Therefore, there will be a shift
of media consumers from ﬁrm 1 to ﬁrm 2. Since ﬁrm 2 will end up with a larger
audience, it can respond by increasing its advertising price.
Competition in strategic complements is generally more aggressive than com-
petition in strategic substitutes, and more so the less diﬀerentiated the products
are (see, e.g.,B u l o w ,et al., 1985, and Vives, 1999). In particular, ﬁrms producing
identical products at identical costs will make a positive proﬁti ft h e yc o m p e t ei n
strategic substitutes, but not if they compete in strategic complements. This ex-
p l a i n sw h yw ea r r i v ea tt h er e s u l tt h a tt h em e d i aﬁrms raise all their revenues from
advertising if their products are perfect substitutes; the proﬁts from consumer prices
are competed away with homogenous products.
How will this analysis be aﬀected if the media ﬁrms are able to invest in product
quality, i.e., undertake investments that make their products more attractive for the
consumers? Improving the product quality increases the willingness to pay for the
media product, and enlarges the size of the audience. In addition to this market-
expansion eﬀect, there is also a business-stealing eﬀect: each media ﬁrm has incen-
tives to invest in quality in order to capture part of the rival’s audience. Since the
audience is more prone to shift from a ”low-quality” to a ”high-quality” media ﬁrm
the less (horizontally) diﬀerentiated the ﬁrms’ products are, the business-stealing
eﬀect is strongest for media outlets that are close substitutes. The media ﬁrms
therefore invest more in quality the less diﬀerentiated their products are. However,
the introduction of quality investments has no eﬀect on the relative merits of con-
sumer payments and advertising revenue: The closer substitutes the media products
are, the more the media ﬁrms rely on advertising - also when quality investments
2This was ﬁrst shown by Nilssen and Sørgard (2001). The same result also shows up in the
analyses of Gabszewicz, et al. (2004b) and Anderson and Coate (2005).
2are available.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next Section, we relate
our study to the existing literature. In Section 3, we start out with discussing the
case of monopoly, showing that the monopoly media ﬁrm’s choice between advertis-
ing and consumer payments depends on the strength of media consumers’ disutility
from advertising relative to advertisers’ beneﬁt from it. When this ratio is high, the
monopolist’ choice is to be completely advertising free. In Section 4, we introduce a
duopoly model and ﬁnd that an increase in competition, in the sense of more simi-
lar media products, makes media ﬁrms shift from consumer payments to advertising
as a source of ﬁnance. Thus, competition endogenously creates a two-sided me-
dia market, with media ﬁrms ﬁnanced partly by advertising revenue and partly by
consumer payments, with the role of advertising increasing as competition becomes
ﬁercer. Section 5 expands on this analysis by considering media ﬁrms’ incentives to
invest in quality as competition increases. We ﬁnd that more competition leads to
increased incentives to make quality investments but that ﬁrms’ choices of source of
ﬁnance are basically unaﬀected by the introduction of quality investments. Finally,
we oﬀer some concluding remarks in Section 6.
2 Related literature
The question of why advertising revenue is important to many media ﬁrms has re-
ceived a lot of attention lately. One reason being put forward is that it may be
impossible, or at least diﬃcult, to collect money from the public in some cases. This
has been used as an explanation for why so few newspapers on the Internet are
ﬁnanced by user payment, and why so many broadcasting ﬁrms historically have
relied heavily on advertising income. However, as argued by Armstrong (2005),
technological progress and new payment systems presumably make this a less im-
portant reason now than it was earlier. Another explanation for absence of user
payment may be that the eﬃciency gains of advertising can be large compared to
consumers’ disutility of being interrupted by commercials. In such a case, ﬁrms
may have a relatively high willingness to pay for advertising, and a media ﬁrm may
3ﬁnd it proﬁtable to sell advertising space even if this should make the media ﬁrm’s
product less attractive for the consumers.
One important strand of the literature on media economics ﬁxes the media ﬁrms’
ﬁnancing and discusses implications, particularly for the program content, of the
ﬁrms being ﬁnanced by either consumer payments or advertising. This includes the
classic study by Spence and Owen (1977) and more recent contributions by Wurf
and Cuilenburg (2001) and Peitz and Valletti (2004). In an interesting paper, Chae
and Flores (1998) analyze how we should expect pay TV and advertising-ﬁnanced
TV to diﬀer on certain main characteristics of the programmes they oﬀer. Their
main result is that pay TV tends to show programs for which there is a relatively
small audience, but with a high willingness to pay. Advertising-ﬁnanced TV, on
the other hand, focuses on large markets where the audience has a relatively low
willingness to pay. Chae and Flores thus focus purely on the demand side to explain
how media ﬁrms are ﬁnanced, while we take into account the two-sidedness of the
media industries in our analysis.
The only paper we are aware of, besides ours, that considers media ﬁrms which
are partly ﬁnanced by advertising and partly by consumer payments, is Godes, et
al. (2003). However, they have a diﬀerent model set-up and focus. In particular,
Godes, et al. analyze competition between diﬀerent media industries (e.g.,n e w s p a -
per and TV). Media ﬁrms within a given industry are assumed to be homogeneous,
and in their main model, consumers are indiﬀerent to the level of advertising.3 Also
Anderson (2003) endogenizes media-ﬁrm ﬁnancing, but ﬁrms can only choose be-
tween being completely advertising-ﬁnanced and completely ﬁnanced by consumer
payments. Allowing consumers to diﬀer with respect to their dislike for commercials,
he ﬁnds that pay TV and advertising-ﬁnanced TV may coexist, where the viewers
with the greatest dislike for ads watch pay TV. In the work of Gabszewicz, et al.
(2005), there are both ad-avoiders and ad-lovers in the audience, but they consider
3In an extension, they allow the various media industries to diﬀer with respect to the consumers’
disutility of advertising, so that, for instance, commercials on TV are perceived to be more negative
than commercials in newspapers. This is an interesting path of research, which we think deserves
more attention.
4the case of monopoly only.
Within the related literature on two-sided markets, there are several analyses of
platform ﬁrms’ simultaneous pricing decisions on both sides. There are, however,
some important diﬀerences between our work and this literature. Consider, for
example, the seminal study by Rochet and Tirole (2003).4 They focus on the credit-
card industry, with buyers on one side and merchants on the other. First of all, they
have positive externalities in both directions, while we have negative externalities
from advertisers to audience. Thus, prices cannot immediately be expected to be
structured so as to "get both sides on board", as Rochet and Tirole put it (p.
1013). Secondly, the users of the platf o r m si nt h e i rc o n t e x th a v en ob e n e ﬁtf r o mt h e
consumption except the transaction it creates between the two sides. In our context,
on the other hand, the audience beneﬁt from the media product in itself, and actually
the more so the less the other side is present. Thus, audience demand does not, for
example, depend on whether or not there is multihoming among advertisers, as is
t h ec a s ew i t hb u y e r si nR o c h e ta n dT i r o l e ’ sm o d e l .W i t ht h e s ed i ﬀerences in mind,
the present study still contributes to the growing literature on two-sided markets
by pointing out how a diﬀerence in the kind of competition on the two sides of
the market (i.e., strategic complements versus strategic substitutes) determines the
pricing schedules. Indeed, we demonstrate that competition by itself creates the
two-sidedness, since a monopoly ﬁr mm a yc h o o s et oh a v ea l li t sr e v e n u e sf r o mt h e
audience.
3T h e m o n o p o l y c a s e
Consider a monopoly media ﬁrm. The ﬁrm’s product could for instance be a TV
program, a printed newspaper, or an Internet newspaper. The media consumers will
interchangeably be labelled viewers and audience.
T h e r ei sac o n t i n u u mo fc o n s u m e r sw i t hm e a s u r e1 .L e tV denote the quantity
consumed by each consumer of the product provided by the media ﬁrm, and let A
4For general discussions of two-sided markets, see Evans (2003), Rochet and Tirole (2004), and
Armstrong (2005).
5denote the quantity of advertising carried by the ﬁrm. Then, a consumer’s (gross)
utility of the consumed quantity is given by




where γ>0, so that the consumer suﬀers a utility loss from advertising which is
greater the more advertising there is in the product and the more she consumes of
it; this particular utility function is used because it is easily generalizable to the
duopoly case treated in the next Section.
Each consumer has to make a direct payment p ≥ 0 per unit of the product
(e.g., per copy of a newspaper). Consumer surplus is thus equal to CS = U − pV .
Putting ∂CS/∂V =0 ,w eﬁnd a simple expression for the audience’ demand for the
media product:
V =1− p − γA. (2)
The size of the audience is decreasing in the consumer price p, the advertising level
A, and the parameter γ, measuring the strength of consumers’ disutility from being
interrupted by advertising.
For the sake of simplicity, we put the media ﬁrm’s production costs equal to zero,
so that its proﬁti s
Π = AR + pV, (3)
where R denotes the price per unit of advertising.
Consumer-good producers advertise with the media ﬁrm if the beneﬁto fd o i n g
so is larger than the cost. For simplicity, we assume throughout that there is only
one advertiser, but it can be shown that the qualitative results of the paper hold for
an arbitrary number of advertisers. The producer’s gross gain from advertising is
naturally increasing in its advertising level and in the number of viewers exposed to
t h ec o m m e r c i a l s .W em a k ei ts i m p l eb ya s s u m i n gt h a tt h eg r o s sg a i ne q u a l sηAV,
where η>0 measures the strength of the advertiser’s beneﬁt from advertising. The
net gain for the producer of advertising now is
π = A(ηV − R). (4)
6The advertiser chooses the advertising level so as to maximize proﬁt. Solving
∂π/∂A =0and taking account of the non-negativity constraint on advertising,
we ﬁnd that the demand for advertising is
A =m a x
½
0,




The media ﬁrm maximizes proﬁtw i t hr e s p e c tt op and R, subject to (2) and (5).
Assuming that non-negativity constraints are fulﬁlled (A ≥ 0, and p ≥ 0),w eﬁnd
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This shows that the media ﬁrm relies less on advertising and more on direct consumer
payment the stronger is consumers’ disutility from being interrupted by advertising.
If
γ
η ≥ 1,t h em o n o p o l yﬁrm is advertising-free in optimum.














An increase in η m e a n st h a ti tb e c o m e sr e l a t i v e l ym o r ep r o ﬁtable for the media ﬁrm
to sell advertising space. Therefore, ∂A
∂η > 0. However, in order to raise revenue
through the advertising market, it is important for the media ﬁrm to have a large
audience. The optimal consumer price is consequently decreasing in η, and the




We can now state:
7Proposition 1: The monopoly media ﬁrm is ﬁnanced












iii) purely by consumer payments (A =0 )if
γ
η ≥ 1.
4A d u o p o l y m o d e l
Below, we consider a context with two competing media ﬁrms. The two ﬁrms
determine simultaneously their advertising and consumer prices. In order to simplify
the algebra and highlight the eﬀect of media competition, we put γ = η =1in the
rest of our analysis. For these parameter values, we know from Proposition 1 that
a monopolist would choose to be advertising-free.
With two media ﬁrms, consumers’ (gross) utility is modiﬁed to














This particular function is a one-parameter version of the standard quadratic utility
function, see, e.g., Vives (1999) for an exposition.5 That one parameter is b ∈ [0,1),
which measures the degree of horizontal diﬀerentiation between the products of the
two media ﬁrms. The products are completely independent if b =0 , while there is
no horizontal diﬀerentiation between them in the limit as b → 1. More generally,
the media ﬁrms’ products are closer substitutes from the consumers’ point of view
the higher is b. The parameter is introduced in this particular way in order for
t h e r et ob en oe ﬀe c to nm a r k e ts i z ef r o ma ni n c r e a s ei nb,o n l ya ne ﬀect on product
diﬀerentiation. Putting b =0brings us to a situation with two monopoly ﬁrms,
each in a situation identical to the one we discussed in the previous Section.
The consumers’ demand for the media products is found by maximizing consumer
surplus,
CS = U − p1V1 − p2V2, (9)
5This utility function is the same as the one we used in Barros, et al. (2004) and Kind, et al.
(2005).







,i , j =1 , 2,i 6= j. (10)
Demand for the media product of a ﬁrm is thus decreasing in its own price and
advertising level, and increasing in those of its rival. This reﬂects the fact that the
consumers perceive the media products as (imperfect) substitutes.
We maintain the assumption that there is only one advertiser, which now has a
proﬁt level given by
π = A1V1 + A2V2 − A1R1 − A2R2. (11)
To ﬁnd the demand for advertising, we use equations (10) and (11) to solve









,i , j =1 , 2,i 6= j. (12)
Similarly to the monopoly case, the proﬁt level of media ﬁrm i equals
Πi = AiRi + piVi,i =1 ,2. (13)
We are now ready to note the following crucial property of our model of media
competition:
Proposition 2: Consumer payments are strategic complements and advertising
prices are strategic substitutes.
This result follows from equations (10), (12), and (13), from which we ﬁnd that
∂2Πi
∂pi∂pj = b
2(1−b) > 0,a n d
∂2Πi
∂Ri∂Rj = − b
2(1+b) < 0.
Proposition 2 shows that there is an important diﬀerence between the two mar-
kets in which the media ﬁrms operate. In the consumer market, an increase in one
ﬁrm’s price would provide the other ﬁrm with incentives to increase its price too.
This is in line with the normal textbook depiction of price competition. Things are
quite diﬀerent in the advertising market, though. As equation (12) shows, the de-
mand for advertising facing media ﬁrm i is decreasing not only in its own price but
also in that of the rival ﬁrm, Rj (for b>0). To see why, suppose that Rj increases.
This causes the advertising level at that media ﬁrm to decrease, making it relatively
9more attractive for the audience. Some viewers will therefore shift to media ﬁrm j
from media ﬁrm i, and more so the closer substitutes the media ﬁrms are. Due to a
smaller audience, the demand for advertising at media ﬁrm i is reduced. So if media
ﬁrm 1, say, were to increase its advertising price, it would sell less advertising. And
since advertising is a nuisance to consumers, this would result in a shift in audi-
ence to media ﬁrm 1 from media ﬁrm 2, which consequently experiences a smaller
demand for advertising. Thereby, media ﬁrm 2 will have an incentive to reduce its
advertising price. In other words, ﬁrms’ advertising prices are strategic substitutes.
The fact that consumer payments are strategic complements and advertising
prices strategic substitutes has important implications for how the competition be-
tween the media ﬁrms works. Competition in strategic complements is more aggres-
sive than competition in strategic substitutes, and more so the less diﬀerentiated the
services are (e.g.,B u l o w ,et al., 1985, and Vives, 1999). As competition becomes
ﬁercer and b increases, the media ﬁrms’ equilibrium price to consumers therefore
gets lower while their advertising price gets higher. Thus, competitive forces make
the media ﬁrms choose to be partly ﬁnanced by advertising, in contrast to the mo-
nopolist case treated in the previous Section, and in the limit as b tends to 1, they
are completely advertising ﬁnanced.
To show this, we maximize proﬁt (13) subject to the audience function (10) and
the demand for advertising (12). Solving ∂Πi/∂pi = ∂Πi/∂Ri =0simultaneously




, and pi =
1 − b
2 − b
,i =1 ,2. (14)





, and Vi =
4+2 b − b2
2(4− b2)
,i =1 ,2.( 1 5 )







db < 0; the more competition the ﬁrms face, the lower is proﬁt.






Because of symmetry, we can write S = S1 = S2. Using equations (14) and (15), we
express S as a function of b:
S(b)=
(1 − b)(2+b)(4+2b − b2)
2(4− 3b2)
; (17)
Here, S0(b) < 0, S(0) = 1,a n dlimS(b)b→1 =0 . We can therefore conclude:
Proposition 3: Consumer revenue as share of total revenue is lower the closer
substitutes the media ﬁrms’ products are. At b =0 ,t h em e d i aﬁrms are completely
ﬁnanced by consumer payments, while they are completely ﬁnanced by advertising in
the limit as b → 1.
The equilibrium outcome is illustrated in Figure 1, where we graph advertising
revenue (AiRi) and consumer revenue (piVi) as a function of b.T h e F i g u r e s h o w s
clearly that an increase in media competition leads to a shift from consumer pay-
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Figure 1: Revenue from consumers and advertisers.
11From equation (15), we get another interesting feature of our model:
Proposition 4: The media ﬁrms’ audiences are larger the closer substitutes
their products are:
dVi
db > 0,i=1 ,2.
There are two eﬀects on the audience sizes as b increases: Consumer prices go
down, having a positive impact on audience sizes. At the same time, advertising
goes up, having a negative impact. Since an increase in b means that competition
increases - reducing the media ﬁrms’ ability to utilize their market power over the
consumer - the former eﬀect dominates. Thus, the closer substitutes the two media
ﬁrms produce, the larger the size of the audience. This is similar to the eﬀect we
ﬁnd in more traditional markets, where stronger competition leads to higher output.
In combination, Propositions 3 and 4 predict that media ﬁrms that are mainly
advertising ﬁnanced have relatively large audiences. However, this is not because
they seek a broader public as such. On the contrary, as shown above, a proﬁt-
maximizing monopoly would choose to have no advertising, high user payments
and a relatively small audience. This ﬁts well with the observation that pay-TV
channels (and specialized Internet sites with user payment) typically have relatively
few viewers.6
5 Investments in quality
In the above analysis, a media ﬁrm could aﬀect its attractiveness only through
changes in its advertising and consumer prices. We now extend our analysis by
incorporating the ability of a media ﬁrm to invest in content quality (e.g.,p r o g r a m -
ming). Even though this opens up a new arena for competition between the media
ﬁrms, we will show below that the relative merit of the two sources of ﬁnancing
is unaltered: As competition gets stronger, the importance of consumer payments
decreases, and that of advertising increases.
The extension calls for a respeciﬁcation of consumer preferences. We accordingly
6This eﬀect would not show up in a standard Hotelling framework, where the total number of
consumers is given. See also the discussion in Section 6.
12modify the utility function in (8) to:














where Qi ≥ 0 (i =1 ,2) measures the consumers’ perceived quality of the content
provided by media ﬁrm i.7 Thus, a consumer beneﬁts more from a media product
the higher its quality is, and more so the more she consumes of it. Our earlier
analysis corresponds to the special case where quality is ﬁxed at Q1 = Q2 =0 .
Maximization of consumer surplus now implies that ﬁrms have the following










,i , j =1 ,2,i 6= j. (19)
This gives rise to the following demand for advertising, where account is taken of










,i , j =1 ,2,i 6= j. (20)
The proﬁtf u n c t i o no fe a c hm e d i aﬁrm is as before, except for the costs incurred
from investing in content quality:
Πi = AiRi + piVi − ϕ(Qi),i =1 ,2, (21)
where ϕ(·) is assumed to satisfy the second-order condition for an interior solution.
See Appendix for a precise statement of this condition.
We assume that the ﬁrms simultaneously determine how much to invest in quality
(i.e.,e a c hﬁrm choosing Qi,i=1 ,2)a ts t a g e1 ,w h i l et h e ya ts t a g e2p l a yt h es a m e
pricing game as we analyzed above (each ﬁrm choosing Ri and pi,i =1 ,2).
We solve stage 2 by maximizing Πi with respect to pi and Ri (i =1 ,2), subject









,i , j=1 ,2,i 6= j,( 2 2 )
7By “quality”, we mean anything that make the content more attractive for the consumers.







(2 − b2)Qi − bQj
2 − b2 − b
¶
,i , j=1 ,2,i 6= j. (23)




(1 + Qi),i =1 ,2, (24)
and
Vi =




(4 − 3b2)Qi − b(2 − b2)Qj
4 − 3b2 − b(2 − b2)
¶
,i , j=1 ,2,i 6= j. (25)
At stage 1, the two media ﬁrms decide on how much to invest in quality. Setting
∂Πi/∂Qi =0for i =1 ,2 we ﬁnd that each ﬁrm’s optimal quality investment level




8+4 b − 4b2 − b3
(4 − b2)
2 ,i =1 ,2. (26)




To see why the quality level is increasing in b, it is useful to consider the eﬀects
of quality improvement on revenues from advertising and user payments separately.












i.e.,m e d i aﬁrm i will charge a higher advertising price and sell a larger number of
advertising banners the more it invests in quality improvements. This stems from
the media ﬁrm attracting a larger audience, and thus becoming more attractive to
the advertisers, the more it invests in quality improvements. It should be noted that
this is partly due to the fact that a unilateral increase in Qi improves the quality
of that media ﬁrm, making media ﬁrm i relatively more attractive than media ﬁrm
j. This implies that each ﬁrm has an incentive to invest in quality improvements
in order to steal viewers from its competitor, and this business-stealing eﬀect is
stronger the closer substitutes the consumers perceive the media ﬁrms’ products to












2 > 0. (28)
In order to see how a unilateral quality improvement of media ﬁrm i aﬀects the














i.e.,m e d i aﬁrm i attracts a larger audience and is able to charge higher user payments






16(1 − b)+3 b4
(1 − b)
2 (4 − b2)






2 < 0. (30)
Again, the business-stealing eﬀect implies that the size of the audience for media
ﬁrm i increases more due to a quality improvement the higher is b. This explains why
∂2Vi/∂Qi∂b > 0. However, the price competition between the media ﬁrms is tougher
the closer substitutes their products are. Therefore the price increase due to a quality
improvement is decreasing in b, so that ∂2pi/∂Qi∂b < 0. Thus, the media ﬁrms are
less able to charge the consumers for higher programming investments the higher is
b, indicating that consumer payments as a source of revenue is less important the
closer horizontal substitutes the media ﬁrms produce, also when Q is endogenous.
To see this formally, we can make use of the symmetry of the equilibrium to write
R = R1 = R2,p= p1 = p2,A = A1 = A2,V= V1 = V2,a n dQ = Q1 = Q2. Putting





(1 + Q), p =
1 − b
2 − b




(1 + Q),a n dV =
4+2 b − b2
2(4− b2)
(1 + Q), (32)
where Q is implicitly given by eq. (26). These expressions for prices and quantities
are the same as in our previous analysis without quality investments, except that
they are now multiplied by (1 + Q). This means that consumer revenue as share of
15total revenue, S(b), is independent of whether quality investments are endogenous
or ﬁxed at zero. We thus know from Section 3 that S(0) = 1 and S0(b) < 0.
We conclude:
Proposition 5: In a stable and symmetric equilibrium, the media ﬁrms invest
more in quality and raise a smaller share of their revenues from consumers the closer
substitutes the media products are.
6 Concluding remarks
The main purpose of this paper is to show that the tougher the competition between
media ﬁrms is, the more important are advertising revenues likely to be. In order to
show this, we set up a very simple model where a media ﬁrm, when it is a monopolist,
maximizes proﬁtb yb e i n gﬁnanced purely by the audience, but where it ends up
being purely ﬁnanced by advertising when it faces competition from a media ﬁrm
whose product is close to a perfect substitute. We further show that competition
between media ﬁrms makes them invest more in quality, but that these investments
do not change the way they are ﬁnanced.
A crucial assumption behind our results is that the media ﬁrms compete in
prices. Assuming price competition in the consumer market is hardly controversial,
but it could be argued that it is more reasonable to assume that media ﬁrm compete
in advertising quantities rather than in advertising prices. First, media ﬁrms can
presumably relatively easily commit themselves with respect to how much space to
allocate to commercials. Second, it may be argued that media ﬁrms plan in terms
of quantities: how many pages of advertising should there be in a newspaper, and
how often should a television program be interrupted by commercials (see Godes,
et al., 2003)? In practice, however, there are no physical limits to how much space
media ﬁrms can use for advertising. Thus, the ﬁrms need to communicate possibly
self-imposed quantity limits to the market. But what we typically observe is an-
nouncement of advertising prices only; it is rather uncommon to see that printed
newspapers commit to a maximum number of pages with advertising, or that TV
16channels commit to a maximum time for commercials per day.8 Nor do we observe
advertisers paying a lower price the more total advertising there is at a media ﬁrm,
which could be an indirect way of committing to a ”low” advertising volume. The
advertising-price scheme is rather based on, for instance, the size of the audience
and the number of minutes the commercial of a given advertiser is shown.
We have assumed that consumers pay a ﬁxed price per viewing time on TV or
per copy of a newspaper, which may be a reasonable approximation to the pricing
schedule used on pay-TV and non-subscription newspapers, for instance. It should
be noted, though, that many media ﬁrms have a ﬁxed monthly or annual fee. An
interesting extension of the model would be to consider alternative payment models
in order to analyze the robustness of the result that advertising revenue tends to
become more important for media ﬁrms the higher the competitive pressure.
Our model may be considered as a complement to research papers on media
economics that build on the Hotelling framework. The advantage of the Hotelling
framework is that it makes it possible to endogenize the extent of horizontal diﬀer-
entiation between the media products. However, a disadvantage is that the total
number of consumers typically is given, such that aggregate output is independent
of whether there is any competition. In our framework, competition leads to higher
output, and we believe that this is a reasonable prediction both in the media industry
and in other markets.9
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Second-order conditions and proof that
dQ
db > 0:




(8 − 4b +8 b2 +3 b3 + b4)+( 8− 8b2 + b4)Qi − b(4 − 3b2)Qj
(1 − b)(4− b2)
2 −φ
0(Qi)=0 ,








8 − 8b2 + b4
(1 − b)(4 − b2)2. (34)




¯ ¯ ¯ < 1,i 6= j.





(8 − 8b2 + b4) − (1 − b)(4− b2)
2 φ
00(Qi)
,i , j=1 ,2,i 6= j,
from which it follows that the stability condition requires
φ
00 > ˆ φ :=
(1 + b)(8− 4b − 4b2 + b3)
(1 − b)(4− b2)
2 . (35)
Comparing the critical values of φ
00 in (34) and (35) veriﬁes that the second-order
condition holds if the system is stable.
To prove that quality investments are increasing in b, we ﬁrst totally diﬀerentiate
(33) with respect to Qi,Q j and b, and then set dQ = dQi = dQj, and Q = Qi = Qj.





¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
Q
=
16 − 8b3 − b4
(4 − b2)
3 (1 + Q), (36)
where B := 8+4b−4b2−b3
(4−b2)
2 < ˆ φ,w h e r eˆ φ is deﬁned in (35). Thus, stability implies
that the square-bracketed term on the left-hand side of (36) is positive. Since the
right-hand side of (36) is positive for all values of b, it follows that
dQ
db > 0 if the
stability condition is satisﬁed. Q.E.D.
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